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SUMMARY
This standard describes safeguards that firms should implement when their 
professionals join firm audit clients. These safeguards are designed to assist in 
ensuring that:
■ professionals who are broadly evaluating their career options will 
exercise an appropriate level of skepticism while performing audits prior to 
their departure from the firm;
■ a former firm professional now employed by the client cannot 
circumvent the audit because of familiarity with its design, approach, or 
testing strategy; and
■ the remaining members of the audit team maintain objectivity when 
evaluating the work and representations of a former firm professional now 
employed by the audit client.
The procedures should be adapted depending on several factors, including 
whether the professional served as a member of the audit team, the positions 
he or she held at the firm and has accepted at the client, the length of time that 
has elapsed since the professional left the firm, and the circumstances of his or 
her departure.
The standard also specifies the circumstances under which capital and 
retirement balances owed to the departing professional should be liquidated or 
settled to preserve the firm’s independence.
The standard’s requirements are effective for employment with audit client 
situations arising after December 31, 2000.
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Independence Standards Board Standard No. 3 
Employment with Audit Clients
STANDARD
Underlying Principle
1. An audit firm’s independence is impaired with respect to an audit client 
that employs a former firm professional who could, by reason of his or her 
knowledge of and relationships with the audit firm, adversely influence the 
quality or effectiveness of the audit, unless the firm has taken steps that 
effectively eliminate such risk.
Safeguards
2. An established program of safeguards including the following procedures, 
when conscientiously administered, is deemed to constitute steps that 
effectively eliminate the risk of independence impairment:
a. Pre-change in employment safeguards:
i. Firm professionals are required promptly to report to the firm 
conversations between themselves and an audit client respecting 
possible employment.
ii. Firm professionals engaged in negotiations respecting possible 
employment with an audit client are immediately removed from the 
audit engagement.
iii. Upon removal of a professional from the audit engagement as 
provided above, the firm reviews the professional’s work to assess 
whether he or she exercised appropriate skepticism while working on 
the audit engagement.
b. Post-change in employment safeguards:
i. If a professional accepts employment with the audit client, the 
on-going engagement team gives active consideration to the 
appropriateness or necessity of modifying the audit plan to adjust for 
risk of circumvention.
ii. When a former firm professional joins an audit client and will 
have significant interaction with the audit team, the firm takes 
appropriate steps to provide that the existing audit team members 
have the stature and objectivity to effectively deal with the former firm 
professional and his or her work.
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iii. When a former firm professional joins an audit client 
within one year of disassociating from the firm and the 
professional has significant interaction with the audit team, 
the next following annual audit is separately reviewed by a firm 
professional uninvolved in the audit to determine whether the 
remaining engagement team maintained the appropriate 
skepticism when evaluating the representations and work of a 
former firm professional. The extent of this review should be 
tailored based on the position that the former professional has 
assumed at the audit client and other facts and circumstances 
that would heighten or mitigate threats to independence.
iv. The firm requires the prompt (1) liquidation of all capital 
balances of former firm partners who become employed by an 
audit client; (2) settlement  of all retirement balances  of 
former firm professionals who become so employed that are not 
both immaterial to the firm and fixed as to amount and timing 
of payment; and (3) settlement of retirement balances of any 
firm professional, regardless of the financial immateriality of 
such balances to the firm, when, within five years of 
disassociating from the firm the identity of such former firm 
professional as an officer or employee of the audit client is 
required to be disclosed in the audit client's proxy statement or 
annual report filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) pursuant to its regulations.
1 2
1 In the United States, the payment of retirement benefits to the individual would immediately subject such 
benefits to income taxes. In some cases, this tax liability can be deferred by transferring the remaining 
retirement benefits to an Individual Retirement Account or similar vehicle, in which case the amounts 
become taxable only when paid to the individual. In other cases, the amount can be transferred to a "Rabbi 
Trust" which also serves to defer such income taxes. A Rabbi Trust is an irrevocable trust whose assets are 
not accessible to the firm until all benefit obligations have been met; however, such assets are subject to the 
claims of creditors in the event of the firm’s bankruptcy or insolvency. To meet the requirements of this 
standard, such a trust can only be used if the amounts are fixed as to amount and timing of payment (i.e., 
the benefits do not fluctuate based on firm results, and the present value of benefits due to the departing 
professional can be calculated and placed in the trust), and the bankruptcy of the firm is considered remote.
2 Retirement balances as used in this statement do not include a professional’s benefits under the firm’s 
defined contribution plan, such as a 401 (k) plan, if the firm has no obligation to fund the individual’s 
benefits after he or she disassociates from the firm.
Effective Date
3. The above requirements are effective for employment with audit client 
situations arising after December 31, 2000.
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BACKGROUND
4. The Board began to study the independence implications of audit firm 
professionals going to work for the firm's audit clients shortly after its 
formation. After determining that guidance was needed in these situations, the 
Board began the process of developing a standard concurrent with its work on a 
conceptual framework for auditor independence.
5. A Discussion Memorandum (DM 99-1, Employment with Audit Clients) 
covering the issues was prepared with the assistance of a Board oversight task 
force, and a broad-based project task force consisting of representatives from 
the investor, preparer, academic, and regulator communities, in addition to 
members of the auditing profession. The DM was released in March 1999 for a 
90-day comment period. Comment from investors was specifically sought; the 
DM was mailed to several investor organizations and to 370 institutional 
investors in an effort to encourage responses from that constituency. Twenty­
eight comment letters were received. After considering these letters, and with 
further assistance from the project and Board oversight task forces, the Board 
developed a proposed standard for public comment.
6. An Exposure Draft (ED) of the proposed standard was released at the end 
of December 1999 with a comment period that ended on February 29, 2000. 
Copies of the ED were mailed to a variety of individuals and groups, including 
those representing investors, to encourage and solicit responses. Fourteen 
comment letters were received. After considering these comments, and with 
further assistance from the project and Board oversight task forces, the Board 
approved the issuance of this standard.
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THREATS TO INDEPENDENCE
7. The concerns expressed when professionals leave firms to join audit clients 
are generally threefold:
a. That partners or other audit team members who resign to accept 
positions with audit clients may not have exercised an appropriate level of 
skepticism during the audit process prior to their departure.
b. That the departing partner or other professional may be familiar 
enough with the audit approach and testing strategy so as to be able to 
circumvent them once he or she begins employment with the client.
c. That remaining members of the audit team, who may have been 
friendly with, or respectful of a former partner or other professional when 
he or she was with the firm, would be reluctant to challenge the decisions 
of the former partner or professional and, as a result, might accept the 
client’s proposed accounting without exercising appropriate skepticism or 
maintaining objectivity.
8. The perceived threats to auditor independence when the former partner or 
professional has retirement benefits or a capital account with the audit firm are 
as follows:
a. It may appear that ties between the audit firm and the partner or 
other professional have not been severed - that the firm has placed its 
“own man” (or woman) at the client, functioning as management, and is in 
effect auditing the results of its own work.
b. If the retirement benefits of the former partner or other professional 
vary based on the firm’s profits, then the former partner or other 
professional may be inclined to pay the firm higher fees to inflate his or her 
retirement benefits (or to increase the likelihood of receiving benefits in 
unfunded plans). As a result, the firm may be less rigorous in its scrutiny 
of the client’s accounting policies because its fees are overly rich.
c. If the former partner’s or other professional’s unfunded retirement 
benefits or other monies held by the firm are material to the firm and the 
firm is experiencing cash flow problems, the firm may be less rigorous in 
its audit of the client’s financial statements in exchange for forbearance on 
the amounts owed to the former partner or other professional.
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BASIS FOR CONCLUSIONS
9. The Board’s desire is to protect the quality and integrity of audited 
financial statements for the ultimate benefit of investors and other users of 
those statements. To accomplish this goal, the Board weighed a variety of 
factors, some of which are described below, in determining an appropriate 
approach to address the threats to auditor independence posed by situations 
where firm professionals join audit clients.
Effectiveness of Safeguards
10. The Board believes that the safeguards described in this standard will 
effectively protect auditor independence in situations where firm professionals 
go to work for their audit clients. A requirement to review an individual’s work 
after he or she enters into employment negotiations with an audit client and, 
when appropriate, review the engagement team’s work on the subsequent audit, 
is expected to have a deterrent effect. First, the expectation is that 
professionals who are broadly evaluating their career options will be more 
careful to ensure that the work they perform, including the decisions they make 
during the audit, will withstand scrutiny when they know it will be subject to a 
special review if they enter into employment negotiations with the audit client. 
Second, the skepticism of the remaining audit team members when evaluating 
the statements of a former colleague or leader may be higher; knowing that 
their work will be reviewed, individuals will most likely be more sensitive to 
appearing to have acquiesced to a client’s aggressive or incorrect accounting, 
and will be more likely to refrain from doing so.
11. Open discussion of the client’s employment of audit firm professionals 
with the audit committee or board of directors, as required in certain 
circumstances by ISB Standard No. 1, Independence Discussions with Audit 
Committees, can also serve as an effective safeguard. Airing, “in the sunshine,” 
the potential threats to independence posed by these situations, and the 
safeguards employed by the firm to protect auditor independence, is likely to 
sensitize those involved (both the former firm professional now with the client 
and the remaining audit team) to these issues, and make independence 
impairments less likely. In addition, while auditors are responsible for 
upholding their own professional standards, including those related to 
independence, the audit committee can “set the tone at the top,” and emphasize 
the proper separation between management and the auditor.
12. In developing the standard, the Board allowed for flexibility in adapting the 
safeguards to the facts and circumstances of the employment situation. The 
Board believes, for example, that the concerns one would have when a partner 
joins a client would exist, but to a lesser extent, when professionals with lower 
levels of responsibility join clients. These concerns would also vary depending 
on the nature and level of responsibilities assumed by the professional in his or 
her new role at the client. In addition, the issues may vary for active versus 
retired partners and other professionals, those leaving the firm voluntarily 
versus those terminated, and engagement professionals versus firm 
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professionals having little or no direct prior professional relationship with the 
client. Therefore, the Board believes that an effective standard must establish 
principles that contemplate a variety of situations, especially as the structure of 
firms change, and more professionals are given new responsible, non-partner 
roles in firms.
13. The safeguards proposed in the ED contemplated a review of the former 
firm professional’s work upon employment by the audit client. After further 
consideration, the Board determined that the trigger for this review should be 
instead the commencement of employment negotiations between the firm 
professional and the audit client. The Board believes that the concerns about 
the work of an audit team member contemplating employment with his or her 
audit client would exist regardless of whether the firm professional eventually 
accepted a position at the client. Audit team members in employment 
negotiations with an audit client should be returned to the engagement only if 
negotiations cease and employment is no longer sought.
14. When a former firm professional joins an audit client within one year of 
disassociating from the firm and the professional has significant interaction 
with the audit team, the standard requires an additional review of the next 
annual audit following the professional’s acceptance of employment. This 
review is meant to determine whether the audit team had an appropriate level 
of skepticism when evaluating the work and representations of the former firm 
professional. Some asked whether such a review should always be performed 
prior to the firm’s “sign-off” on the audit. The Board concluded that the 
primary benefit of the review is its deterrent effect. That is, members of the 
audit team, knowing that their work will be subject to an additional review, will 
be less likely to acquiesce to questionable client proposals. Further, mandating 
such a review prior to issuance of the audit report could result in deferring for a 
significant period of time release of the audited financial statements. Such a 
delay could impose a significant cost to users of financial statements and the 
Board did not consider the additional benefits, if any, of a pre-issuance review 
to justify such costs.
Peer Review
15. The ED proposed a requirement that firms have their compliance with the 
provisions of the standard evaluated in a peer review. The Board believes that 
peer review of firms’ compliance with all auditing and quality control standards, 
including independence standards, is an important component of the 
profession’s self-regulation. The Board ultimately concluded, however, that the 
scope or content of established peer review programs should be left to those 
that administer them, and that mandating participation in such a program 
should be left to other groups in the profession’s regulatory system.
Settlement of Financial Interests
16. The Board considered the necessity of a “full-payout” requirement in 
situations where capital account and retirement obligations are immaterial to 
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the firm, and fixed as to amount and timing of payment. The Board believes 
that a former partner of an audit firm who is employed by the firm’s audit client 
should not remain an equity investee in the firm. Accordingly, the standard 
requires the firm to liquidate all capital accounts prior to the employment of the 
professional by the audit client, regardless of their materiality.
17. With respect to retirement obligations, the standard requires the firm to 
settle such obligations prior to employment by the client in all situations where 
a professional’s benefits are not immaterial to the firm, and fixed as to amount 
and timing of payment. The Board concluded, however, that retirement 
obligations owed to a former professional that are both fixed and immaterial to 
the firm are not likely to impinge on the firm’s independence. On the other 
hand, it recognized that unsettled amounts may present an “appearance” 
concern when a former firm professional joins an audit client in a visible 
position where his or her former employment at the client’s audit firm is likely 
to be disclosed or known. Therefore, the standard mandates settlement of even 
immaterial retirement obligations when a former firm professional joins an 
audit client within five years of disassociating from the firm in a position where 
his or her name is required to be disclosed in the company’s proxy statement or 
annual report to the SEC. However, because the character of retirement 
benefits is different from capital balances, the Board concluded that settlement 
of retirement obligations could be done through a "Rabbi Trust" or similar 
vehicle in certain circumstances.
18. In reaching its conclusions regarding retirement balances, the Board was 
concerned that a requirement to settle all obligations could create significant 
tax or other liabilities for the departing partner in either the United States or in 
a foreign country. In addition, such a requirement might jeopardize the tax 
status of certain qualified plans if all plan participants were not treated equally. 
Such a result could serve to either actively discourage the partner from 
accepting the employment position, require the client to engage a new audit 
firm, or drive firms to reduce benefits provided under its plans because of 
accelerated funding requirements. The Board did not believe such 
consequences were in the public interest except for benefits that were not both 
fixed and immaterial to the firm, and in the limited circumstances involving 
former partners identified in an SEC filing, as described in paragraph 2(b)(iv).
19. Some expressed concern that a former firm professional could join a large, 
multinational audit client several years after leaving the firm, perhaps at a 
foreign location. In these circumstances, it is possible that the firm would not 
be aware of the former professional’s new position at the audit client, and may 
not have liquidated capital balances, or retirement benefits that are not both 
immaterial and fixed. The Board does not intend that an inadvertent and 
isolated failure to comply with these settlement provisions be deemed an 
impairment of independence. It does expect, however, that firms will impose 
conditions on former professionals who have remaining capital accounts or 
other than immaterial and fixed retirement benefits with the firm. One of those 
conditions should be to advise the firm when they are contemplating a change 
in employment, to allow the firm to determine if the new employer is a client 
subject to this standard. These arrangements should eliminate the need to 
implement elaborate and burdensome partner and employee tracking systems 
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to comply with the provisions of the standard - a concern of some of the 
respondents to the ED. However, any inadvertent failures to comply should be 
corrected as soon as identified.
20. In reaching these conclusions, the Board considered making several 
distinctions, suggested by respondents to the DM, in determining when 
standards should require a full-payout of retirement benefits. These 
respondents suggested that a settlement requirement distinguish between 
defined contribution plan benefits and defined benefit plan benefits, fully 
funded benefits versus unfunded amounts, fixed benefits versus those that vary 
based on profits, and other criteria. The Board concluded that benefits which 
are other than immaterial to the firm, or that vary based on, for example, firm 
profitability, should always be settled, regardless of the amount of time that has 
elapsed since the professional’s departure from the firm. In addition, the Board 
concluded that the settlement requirement should not extend to defined 
contribution plan benefits such as those in a 401(k) plan if the firm has no 
ongoing obligation to fund the individual’s benefits.
The Board’s Consideration of a Mandated Cooling-Off Period
21. In studying these issues, the Board considered and rejected a mandated 
“cooling-off period” - a rule deeming an impairment of the firm’s independence 
when certain firm professionals join an audit client. The Board concluded the 
costs of such a rule would exceed its benefits.
22. A cooling-off approach would mean either deeming independence to be 
impaired if any firm professional accepted an employment offer from an audit 
client, or specifying which types of persons would be included in such a rule 
and which would not. The former course seemed unnecessary, and the latter 
very complex or arbitrary, since the types of individuals who might represent 
threats would presumably depend upon their positions in the firm, their roles in 
the audit, and the positions they would be assuming at the audit client. 
Generalizing when that combination might constitute a threat to auditor 
independence and when it would not seemed to be a daunting task which 
should not be undertaken when an effective alternative is available.
23. The Board believes that with the appropriate safeguards in place, as called 
for by this standard, the threats to auditor independence are slight. In 
addition, the Board believes that the benefits to society and the profession of 
allowing firm professionals to accept employment with audit clients, without 
fear of jeopardizing their former firm’s independence, outweigh the costs. In 
reaching this conclusion, the Board recognizes that a mandatory cooling-off 
period may promote the appearance of independence more completely, and 
might eliminate the risk that the audit team could be unduly influenced by a 
former colleague, but it believes the differences in actual threats to 
independence under the two approaches are insignificant.
24. The Board recognizes that the attraction of future employment 
opportunities draws talented and ambitious recruits to the profession. 
Turnover at public accounting firms can be quite high, and many recruits do 
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not intend to stay long enough to be promoted to partner. Furthermore, they 
join public accounting firms because of the broad experience they expect to gain 
at the firm, and the contacts they expect to make in industry. In addition, 
turnover within the partner ranks has increased in the last few years. If the 
future employment prospects of recruits and experienced auditors now working  
for audit firms were limited by a mandated cooling-off period, the Board is 
concerned that the caliber of professional attracted to public accounting might 
decline.
25. The Board agreed with several corporate officials and others responding to 
the DM who argued that companies benefit from the ability to hire staff at all 
levels from their audit team. An auditor who has worked for several years on 
an engagement is often thoroughly familiar with the client’s systems, and 
knows most of the client’s key people and their responsibilities. Beyond 
familiarity with the hiring company, the auditor brings broad experience “to the 
table” from working at a variety of companies, and sometimes in a variety of 
industries. In addition, partners and professionals in public accounting firms 
are generally recognized as experts in accounting, financial reporting, and 
internal control matters - skills needed by companies with financial reporting 
responsibilities to investors.
26. A mandated cooling-off period might force a client to choose between, for 
example, its audit partner and its audit firm, knowing that if the partner was 
hired, the audit firm would have to be replaced. The Board recognizes that 
replacement of an audit firm carries costs to firms, clients, and investors. 
There is a learning curve on a first-year audit; auditors spend significantly more 
time and resources on them (developing audit programs, familiarizing 
themselves with the system of internal controls, etc.), and client personnel 
spend more time answering the auditors’ questions and producing 
documentation previously provided to the prior auditors. And because the 
Board believes that audits are strengthened by institutional continuity, rotation 
of auditors and the increased risk that the first-year audit poses carries a cost 
to investors.
27. The Board acknowledges the counter-argument that a fresh look by a new 
audit team may carry some benefits that cannot be achieved with the same 
audit team and approach year after year. The consideration of a requirement 
that companies change audit firms periodically, however, is beyond the scope of 
this project.
28. The Board also concluded that a restriction on hiring former audit 
partners or other professionals may be a heavier burden to smaller corporations 
in need of the accounting expertise provided by someone familiar with their 
business and industry, and to smaller firms. Smaller corporations may be at a 
disadvantage in recruiting personnel when competing with larger companies 
with strong national or regional name recognition. Restricting these smaller 
companies from hiring directly from their audit firm (from among those who 
know the company well) may hurt them disproportionately.
29. Professionals from smaller accounting firms may face the same difficulties 
when competing in the job market with professionals from large, well-known 
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firms. A rule that impairs the ability to go from an audit firm directly to a 
client, where management knows you and you have had a chance to 
demonstrate your abilities, may be more of a burden if you work for a smaller 
firm.
30. Finally, the Board concluded that a mandatory cooling-off period would be 
ineffective in preventing fraud or collusion between the auditor and client. If 
the firm professional and client management were intent on committing fraud, 
the professional might remain with the firm rather than risk turning the 
engagement over to another individual who may uncover the conspiracy. In 
addition, if management wanted to compensate a firm professional for his or 
her role in a fraud, a ban on hiring the professional for a certain period of time 
would not prevent the company from providing payments to the professional, 
after he or she resigns from the firm, via consulting contracts or other means.
Other Matters
31. The Board concluded that the threats to auditor independence described 
in this standard are in many respects different from those that arise when 
former firm professionals are elected as non-executive members of the Board of 
Directors. Existing rules cover these non-executive director situations and 
remain in effect.
32. This standard was adopted unanimously by the Board.
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